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THE SUPERVISORY STATUS OF PROFESSIONAL
EMPLOYEES
MATTHEW W. FINKIN*
1. INTRODUCTION
HE National Labor Relations Act was amended in 1947 both
AL explicitly to include professional employees (section 2(12))' and to
exclude supervisors (section 2(11));2 yet of necessity much professional
work includes functions which would otherwise be viewed as supervi-
sory under the Act.3 In effect, Congress delegated to the National
Labor Relations Board the responsibility for resolving the tension
between these two overlapping directives.
Unfortunately, the Board's performance has not been satisfactory.
With one exception, the "Adelphi rule," 4 it has failed to develop an
approach to distinguish the supervisory from non-supervisory profes-
sional employee which is at once theoretically sound and easily
applied. Even that singular example has not been consistently followed
A.B. 1963, Ohio Wesleyan; LL. B. 1967, New York University; LL. M. 1973, Yale.
Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University. Because the author also serves as General
Counsel to the American Association of University Professors, it should be stressed that the
opinions expressed are entirely the author's.
1. Section 2(12) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(12) (1970), defines a
professional employee as "(a) any employee engaged in work (i) predominantly intellectual and
varied in character as opposed to routine mental, manual, mechanical, or physical work, (ii)
involving the consistent exercise of discretion and judgment in its performance; (iii) of such a
character that the output produced or the result accomplished cannot be standardized in relation
to a given period of time; (iv) requiring knowledge of an advanced type in a field of science or
learning customarily acquired by a prolonged course of specialized intellectual instruction and
study in an institution of higher learning or a hospital, as distinguished from a general academic
education or from an apprenticeship or from training in the performance of routine mental,
manual, or physical processes; or (b) any employee, who (i) has completed the courses or
specialized intellectual instruction and study described in clause (iv) of subparagraph (a) of this
paragraph, and (ii) is performing related work under the supervision of a professional person to
qualify himself to become a professional employee as defined in said paragraph (a) "
2. Section 2(11) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1970), defines a
supervisor as "any individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer,
suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or
responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such
action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine
or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment"
3. For example, according to a 1969 survey, 18 percent of engineers had no regular
supervisory responsibility, another 18 percent had indirect staff supervision, and 64 percent had
supervisory responsibility ranging from small team to major organizations. The results are noted
in E. Hoffman, Unionization of Professional Societies (Conference Board Report No 690) 19
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Hoffman].
4. See text accompanying notes 59-61 infra.
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by the Board and has met thus far with a surprisingly tepid judicial
reception.-
However, the issue is not inconsequential. Salaried professionals
comprise a large and growing portion of the work force and increas-
ingly they are becoming organized. 6 On the one hand, inclusion of
those who exercise true managerial authority with those who are
supervised would create considerable tension in bargaining and con-
tract administration. On the other, the erroneous determination that
professional employees are statutory supervisors would limit their
participation in the campaign to select or reject a bargaining agent and
would have an adverse effect on the bargaining process by narrowing
the scope of bargaining and by denying the collective representative a
source of support and leadership. Inasmuch as those challenged on
supervisory grounds are often the immediate leaders of professional
work groups, these consequences far transcend the number of those
whose status may be in question. Moreover, several state public
employment collective bargaining laws either deny bargaining rights to
supervisors or place them in separate bargaining units. 7 Because the
definition of a supervisor in these laws often tracks the federal Act, the
Board's decisions can be expected to have a ripple effect as the issue is
presented in the public sector.
Accordingly, this Article will first outline more fully the nature of
the problem delegated to the Board. It will then explore and assess the
Board's record in resolving the conflict. Finally, a standard will be
suggested better attuned to the statutory mandate, the realities of
professional service and the practicalities of unit determination pro-
ceedings.
5. The Second Circuit has expressly declined to rule on the legality of the Adelphi rule
terming it a "difficult" question. NLRB v. Mercy College, 536 F.2d 544, 550 (2d Cir. 1976). The
First Circuit merely adverted to it in the context of a rather limited approval of the extension of
the Act to college faculties. NLRB v. Wentworth Institute, 515 F.2d 550 (1st Cir. 1975). The
Seventh Circuit, in an unreported decision, noted Adelphi with seeming approval as a buttress for
a related holding. University of Chicago v. NLRB, 506 F.2d 1402 (7th Cir. 1974), discussed in
the text accompanying notes 75-79 infra.
6. See generally Hoffman, supra note 3.
7. At least eleven states either exclude supervisors from the definition of an employee or place
them in separate bargaining units. See, e.g., Hawaii Rev. Stat. §§ 89-1 to 20 (Supp. 1975); Iowa
Code Ann. §§ 20.1-.27 (Supp. 1976); Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 75-4321 to 37 (Supp. 1975); Me. Rev.
Stat. Ann. tit. 26, §§ 1021-34 (Supp. 1976); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 423.201-.216 (1967), as
amended, §§ 423.201-.216 (Supp. 1976); Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 179.61-.76 (Supp. 1976); Mont.
Rev. Codes Ann. §§ 59-1601 to 17 (Supp. 1976); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 273-A:1 to 16 (Supp.
1975); N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 34:13A-1 to 13 (1965), as amended, §§ 34:13A-1 to 11 (Supp. 1976);
Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 243.650-.782 (1975); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, §§ 1101.101-.2301 (Purdon Supp
1976).
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II. THE INITIAL DELEGATION To THE BOARD
In fashioning the amendments in 1947, Congress legislated against
the Supreme Court decision in Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 8
which had opened the door for the extension of collective bargaining to
foremen in industrial plants. Thus a "supervisor" was deemed not to
be an "employee" for the purposes of the Act. 9 The policy was
explained in the Senate report
A recent development which probably more than any other single factor has upset
any real balance of power in the collective-bargaining process has been the successful
efforts of labor organizations to invoke the Wagner Act for covering supervisory
personnel, traditionally regarded as part of management, into organizations composed
of or subservient to the unions of the very men they were hired to supervise. ' 0
The Senate report further explained that "[iln framing this
[statutory] definition [of a supervisor] the committee exercised great
care, desiring that the employees herein excluded from the coverage of
the act be truly supervisory. "I1 Although the House version' 2 had cast
a broader net than the Senate's, the Conference Committee accepted
the Senate's more circumspect approach.
In the hearings, representatives of professional employees urged
Congress to legislate against a line of NLRB decisions which had
included professional employees in bargaining units of non-
professionals. At the same time, some management representatives
objected to giving bargaining rights to professional employees at all. In
testimony before the House Committee, the president of the American
Zinc, Lead & Smelting Company opined that professionals are part of
management and should be excluded under the supervisory defini-
tion. 13 To similar effect, in appearing before the Senate Committee,
the representative of the American Mining Congress stated flatly: "Our
position is that not only foremen who are supervisors, but also
professional and administrative and confidential employees should
be exempted from the coverage of the act."'1 4 This statement elicited
the following colloquy:
8. 330 U.S. 485 (1947).
9. The statutory definition of an "employee," 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1970), excludes "any
individual employed as a supervisor . ..."
10. S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1947) [hereinafter cited as Senate Report).
11. Id. at 19.
12. See H.R. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1947) [hereinafter cited as House
Report].
13. Hearings on Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act Before the House Comm.
on Education and Labor, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 1225 (1947).
14. Hearings on S. 55 & S.J. Res. 22 Before Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. 694 (1947).
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Senator Smith. . . . What we are trying to get at is the definition of supervisory
employee or foreman, and I think it is agreed that they should not be employees of the
same union with which they have to bargain. That makes them torn asunder between
two masters. If they are bargaining for the management they should not be members
of the union they are bargaining with. The principle is simple and most labor men I
have talked to agree. You are adding here professional and administrative employees. I
do not think that has ever been questioned by anybody. They do not belong to the
union. They might, but I do not have any evidence.
Mr. Kuzell. Our position goes further than I understood from your statement of
what it is. We believe that none of these groups, supervisory, professional, administra-
tive, or confidential, should have the protection of the act, be exempt from the
coverage of the act; in other words, those to be exempt from the coverage of the act,
even if they are in independent organization. We go that far in our recommendation.
Senator Ellender. Well, there is no doubt in my mind if we exempt supervisory
employees we should by all means exempt professional and administrative employees.
Mr. Chairman, I suggest that Mr. Ryley, who is a good lawyer, take S. 55 and S. 44
and work on them so as to cover the professional and administrative employees.
Senator Smith. I think that is a good suggestion."5
The Senate declined to accept the suggestion endorsed by Senators
Smith and Ellender. Congress did accept the argument made on behalf
of professional employees and established presumptively separate pro-
fessional bargaining units. 16
These two provisions engender a considerable degree of tension. The
supervisory exemption is founded upon the assumption of bureaucratic
managerial structures widely followed in industry. In a bureaucracy
the legitimacy of a decision rests ultimately upon the decision-maker's
position in the hierarchy. Moreover, the demands of scientific man-
agement militate toward standardization, routinization, and accounta-
bility to higher authority. This stands in sharp contrast to the assump-
tion upon which the professions proceed. Lengthy, specialized educa-
tion gives rise to expertise; it is by resort to professional judgment
rather than to hierarchical authority that the legitimacy of a profes-
sional decision is to be tested. This in turn yields claims to autonomy
in professional work, greater stress on quality over efficiency, and to
demands to participate in decisions bearing upon the performance of
professional services. As a considerable body of sociological research
shows, 17 the employment of professionals in large organizations places
15. Id. at 695 (emphasis added).
16. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1970).
17. Some of the more recent writings include Alutto & Belasco, Determinants of Attitudinal
Militancy among Nurses and Teachers, 27 Ind. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 216 (1974); Benson, The
Analysis of Bureaucratic-Professional Conflict: Functional Versus Dialectical Approaches, 14
Sociological Q. 376 (1973); Corwin, The Professional Employee: A Study of Conflict in Nursing
Roles, 66 Am. J. Soc. 604 (1961); Sorensen & Sorensen, The Conflict of Professionals in
Bureaucratic Organizations, 19 Admin. Science Q. 98 (1974).
[Vol. 45
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great strain on the structure of employing bureaucracies and results,
though to varying degree, in accommodations to strongly held profes-
sional views. This is clearest in the university setting where, at least
theoretically, considerable influence if not enforceable authority is
exercised by the professional peer group. It is not, however, limited to
the university. As Simon Marcson observed in his study of an indus-
trial research laboratory: "The strains and conflicts in the authority
system within which professional employees function in this industrial
research organization lead it to adapt elements of the university system
of colleague authority to its own needs. 1' 8 The degree of accommoda-
tion doubtless varies with the business of the employing organization
and the character of the employed professional group but the unifying
factor is that professional employees consistently lay claim to authority
independent of the hierarchy derived from their professional status.' 9
One of the major points of accommodation to professional claims lies
in the mode of supervision. As William Kornhauser observed in his
study of industrial research,
the strain between professional autonomy and bureaucratic control is accommodated
by the creation of new roles for research administration. Administrative matters are
controlled on the basis of hierarchical principles of authority, while matters regarded
by professionals as the primary responsibility of the individual are more subject to
multilateral determination through colleague relations. Thus organizational controls
are relied upon to a greater extent in the sphere of general policy, in research areas
close to operations, and by top research directors, whereas professional controls are
used more extensively in research assignments and procedures, in more basic research
areas, and by first-line research supervisors.20
To some extent this alternative system of authority is recognized in
the congressional willingness to give separate treatment to profes-
sionals. Section 2(12) defined two categories of professional
employees-the full-fledged professional and those who have com-
pleted their academic studies and are "performing related work under
the supervision of a professional" in order to qualify for full profes-
18. S. Marcson, The Scientist in American Industry 133 (1960).
19. See, e.g., Kronus, Occupational Values, Role Orientations, and Work Settings: The Case
of Pharmacy, 16 Sociological Q. 171 (1975). "The chain store pharamacists are a particularly
interesting case, as professionally oriented pharmacists in this setting were especially attuned to
the promise of administrative authority, but equally attracted by autonomy." Id. at 181 n.8.
20. W. Kornhauser, Scientists in Industry 201-02 (1962). The lumping together of research
scientists and engineers as aspiring to the same degree of independence has been criticized in
Ritti, Work Goals of Scientists and Engineers, 7 Indus. Rel. 118 (1968). Nevertheless Ritti
recognizes the close interrelationship between supervision and engineering work. Id. at 129-30,
See generally S. Goldenberg, Professional Workers and Collective Bargaining, Task Force on
Labour Relations Study No. 2 (1968); Imberman, As the Engineer Sees His Problem, 13 Conf.
Bd. Rec. 30 (April 1976).
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sional status. 21 As the Conference report observed: "This definition in
general covers such persons as legal, engineering, scientific and medi-
cal personnel together with their junior professional assistants." 22 Thus
the statute assumed that professionals "supervise" their junior profes-
sional assistants; nevertheless it seems quite clear that that supervision
was deemed insufficient to exempt those senior professionals under the
supervisory exemption inasmuch as they were to be explicitly included
with their professional assistants in professional bargaining units. It
follows a fortiori that supervision of non-professionals by professionals
should not result in triggering the supervisory exemption because much
professional work cannot be performed without non-professional
assistance and the separation of the two for unit purposes ameliorates
the evil of dual loyalty which occasioned congressional concern. How-
ever, the Act did not exempt professionals altogether from the super-
visory definition. Thus Congress compelled a line to be drawn some-
where between the truly supervisory and the non-supervisory profes-
sional and delegated the drawing of that line to the Board.
III. THE BOARD'S RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT
To a large extent the Board has viewed the various categories of
professional employment it has encountered as sui generis; for exam-
ple, it has not tended to compare its analysis in cases governing
architects with those concerning pharmacists or nurses. Accordingly,
while the Board has taken some approaches transcending the particu-
lars of the job at issue, a firm grounding in the Board's experience with
the major categories of professional employment is necessary before
considering the larger question of whether case-by-case adjudication is
the best means of developing a consistent, workable approach to the
reconciliation of sections 2(11) and 2(12).
A. Professionals in Industrial and
Commercial Employment
1. Scientific Personnel
The Board's approach to the supervisory status of industrial scien-
tists and engineers has been entirely ad hoc. In some cases, the Board
has viewed the supervisory exemption as precluding any finding of
employee status without recourse to further consideration of whether
the employee was a professional, i.e., the Board has declined to
acknowledge any overlap between sections 2(11) and 2(12). For exam-
21. 29 U.S.C. § 152(12)(b) (1970).
22. House Report, supra note 12, at 36.
[Vol. 45
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ple, in Warren Petroleum Corp. ,23 the status of a chemist was placed
in issue by the claim that he was either a supervisor or a professional
excluded from the petitioned-for non-professional bargaining unit. The
chemist had two admittedly non-professional assistants whom he had
trained and who performed many of his operations in his absence. The
Board found him to be a supervisor, thereby vitiating any necessity to
decide his professional status. However, the supervisory determination
was placed on the following ground:
It does not appear that the chemist, who is under the supervision of the superintend-
ent, may hire, discharge or otherwise effect changes in the status of the assistants. On
the other hand, the chemist must of necessity responsibly control and direct the
activities of the assistants. 24
Thus the Board assumed that the responsible direction of the activities
of non-professional assistants is sufficient to yield supervisory status
whether the employee is a professional or not. 25
In other decisions, the Board has analogized professional employees
to non-professional leadmen or strawbosses. As a result it has found
professional employees to be non-supervisory even if they direct the
work of others. For example, in Sonotone Corp.,26 decided two years
before Warren Petroleum, the Board reasoned:
The record shows that the engineers do not hire or discharge, do not have disciplinary
or other powers included in the Act's definition of supervisors. The engineers direct the
work of the associate and assistant engineers. We are of the opinion that the
relationship of the engineer to the associate and assistant engineer is primarily that of
the more skilled to the lesser skilled employee and not that of supervisor to sub-
ordinate.
2 7
23. 97 N.L.R.B. 1458 (1952).
24. Id. at 1459.
25. The decision therefore follows an earlier Board determination in Warren Petroleum
Corp., 95 N.L.R.B. 1468 (1951). To similar effect see Dewey Portland Cement Co., 137
N.L.R.B. 944 (1962); Federal Cartridge Corp., 105 N.L.R.B. 529 (1953); Arthur A. Johnson
Corp., 97 N.L.R.B. 1466, 1468 (1952); Union Elec. Power Co., 83 N.L.R.B. 872, 885 (1949)
(librarian). Note especially the reasoning in Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 135 N.L.R.B. 926, 928
(1962): "Wright, the design engineer, is engaged in developmental work on complicated struc-
tures, and designs the detailing of various projects under his control. For periods of 2 or 3 months
he may work alone but at other times he assigns work to two or three draftsmen. He spends
about 6 hours a day at the drafting board, the remainder checking the work of employees
assigned to him and conferring with others on his projects. While he is not authorized to
recommend hire, he can recommend disciplinary action, including discharge. We find that he is a
supervisor within the meaning of the Act and exclude him."
26. 90 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1950).
27. Id. at 1239. See also Puget Sound Power & Light Co., 117 N.L.R.B. 1825 (1957)
(distinguishing between engineers) and Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 122 N.L.R.B. 293
(1958) where the Board concluded: "All engineers above-mentioned who work with assistants are
required to make out merit rating reports from time to time on the work of the subordinates. This
1977]
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The Board has acknowledged that "supervision" given junior pro-
fessionals by their seniors is contemplated under section 2(12)(b) and,
in some cases, has expressly relied on that subsection. 28 Moreover, it
has considered direction given non-professionals by a professional as
not being of a supervisory character even if the amount of direction
was not insubstantial. 29 Sometimes estimates of the amount of time
spent in various activities have been made. 30
Special difficulty has been encountered in dealing with dual status
professionals, i.e., those who in addition to rank-and-file professional
work (if it can be called that) assume added administrative responsibil-
ity. In A'merican Oil Co. 3 1 the Board confronted the status of project
managers responsible for research programs. They made "effective
recommendations" 32 as to which employees should be assigned to the
project team, assigned and evaluated their work while members of the
team, and made recommendations for promotion based on that evalua-
tion. They had a degree of latitude over the hours of team members
applies not only to senior project engineers whose status is in dispute, but to all engineers to
whom assistants are assigned. These reports are completed by answering a series of questions,
customarily used in such matters.
"In support of its contention that the senior project engineers are supervisors, the Employer
urges that (a) they responsibly direct the work of the project engineers and (b) they affect the
status of their subordinates with regard to promotion and salary increases through the merit
rating reports. We find no merit in these contentions. As to (a), it is clear from this record that the
relationship between the senior project engineer and the project engineer, who is also a
professional employee, is that of a more experienced to a less experienced person. The senior
project engineer is more experienced and more knowledgeable in his specialty, and he gives
technical advice, counsel, and guidance to his assistant. We are satisfied that the direction
exercised by the senior project engineers, who have no formal responsibility beyond the project
specifically assigned to them is not of a supervisory nature even though they have the right to ask
for assistance of a lower rated engineer. The same relationship exists between the project engineer
and lower classifications, yet, the Employer does not urge that the project engineers are made
supervisors thereby. As to (b), routine merit rating reports are independently considered by at
least two persons in a section, and in addition, all reports are again independently reviewed by
the entire hierarchy of supervisors. Under such circumstances, we cannot find that the senior
project engineers make effective recommendations within the meaning of the Act." Id. at 295-96
(footnote omitted).
28. Ryan Aeronautical Co., 132 N.L.R.B. 1160 (1961); Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 89
N.L.R.B. 8 (1950) (junior engineers); Union Elec. Power Co., 83 N.L.R.B. 872 (1949).
29. See cases cited in note 28 supra. See also Worden-Allen Co., 99 N.L.R.B. 410 (1952);
Solar Mfg. Corp., 80 N.L.R.B. 1358 (1948); Cities Serv. Oil Co. (Pa.), 75 N.L.R.B. 468 (1947).
30. United States Metals Ref. Co., 93 N.L.R.B. 795 (1951), holding a spectrograph gangleader
to be a professional (but not reaching the supervisory issue) with the observation that "[t]wenty
percent of his time is spent in directing the work of his subordinates, 50 percent is spent in routine
work, and the remaining 30 percent is spent in research and in developing better methods for
spectrograph analysis." Id. at 798.
31. 155 N.L.R.B. 46 (1965).
32. Id. at 47.
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and handled "informal grievances and complaints" 3 3 from employees
on the project. The Board held them to be supervisors on the ground
"that project managers exercise independent judgment in assigning
work and in responsibly directing employees within their projects." 34
However, some researchers functioned as project managers only some
of the time; thus they held a dual status. The Board held that
inasmuch as they spent a "substantial amount of their work time" 3"
as project managers they also should be excluded as supervisors.
The problem of dual status employment was reconsidered two years
later in Westinghouse Electric Corp.3 6 where professional engineers
served part of the time as lead engineers during which period they
exercised supervisory responsibilities over non-professional craftsmen.
The Board considered them to be "primarily attached to the nonsuper-
visory work force" 37 and, following a decision governing non-
professional seasonal supervisors, 38 held that any engineer who spent
less than half his time during the preceding year engaged as a lead
engineer would be eligible to vote for representation but that any
bargaining agent selected may not represent such employees with
respect to their supervisory duties. The Board stressed that the two
roles were clearly demarcated both by function and in time and that
"when employed as supervisory leadmen, their right to exercise super-
visory authority does not extend to any other engineers but is limited,
rather, to the nonprofessional craft employees hired for the project
work. '3 9 This, the Board noted, lessened or obviated the problem of
divided loyalty.
More recently, in General Dynamics Corp., 40 the Board was com-
pelled to consider (in far greater detail then it desired) the status of
professional engineering employees who function as project leaders or
program managers of research projects. The facts recounted seem
indistinguishable from those in American Oil-the program manager
selected the personnel he needed from various departments of the
company, assigned and directed them, removed them from the project
33. Id.
34. Id. at 48.
35. Id. However, the Board held "research supervisors" to be non-supervisory even though
they were called on to rate the performance of professional or non-professional associates. Id See
also Loral Electronics Sys., 200 N.L.R.B. 1019 (1972) on professional work as a group or team
effort not resulting in supervisory status.
36. 163 N.L.R-B. 723 (1967), enforced, 424 F.2d 1151 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831
(1970).
37. Id. at 727.
38. Great W. Sugar Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 551 (1962).
39. 163 N.L.R.B. at 727.
40. 213 N.L.R.B. 851 (1974).
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if he deemed them unsatisfactory and evaluated their performance.
However, he had no direct authority to hire, fire, discipline, discharge,
promote or the like since these matters were the prerogatives of the
team members' home departments from which they were borrowed for
work on the project. Thus evaluation of team members by the leader
was explained by the Board in somewhat perplexing language verging
on a non sequitur:
[S]ince they [the leaders] work directly with the disciplines in their groups for weeks,
months, and sometimes years, they are more aware of the professional and/or technical
aspects of the work performance of their team members than the members' functional
supervisors [in their home departments] and, therefore, the project leader's "opinion
weighs quite heavily." Beyond this, there is no specific evidence that such evaluations
are afforded effective consideration by the functional supervisor, or that they have
impacted a career.41
As with the dual status project managers in American Oil these
leaders may serve simultaneously or successively as leaders and as
team members on different projects. Nevertheless, the Board declined
to find these lead engineers to be supervisors. The two member
majority, citing to the legislative history, stressed that the possession of
the powers enumerated in section 2(11) will not result in supervisory
status "unless it is exercised in the genuine managerial sense." '42
Accordingly, they distinguished professional from supervisory work by
relying on decisions concerning professional architects:
Here, while, proposal managers, proposal team members, and project leaders
exercise a certain amount of discretion in assigning work, that discretion primarily is
[exercised] by the only people technically competent to [exercise] it and within the
parameters set by the utilization of systems engineering. Such discretions [sic] as the
professional engineers may have in work assignment and direction, moreover, are
exercised in a professional sense and are directly related to a professional responsibility
for the quality of work performed on the projects to which they are assigned. They
merely are providing professional direction and coordination primarily for other
professional employees. 43
The Board concluded:
In our view, true supervisorial authority is not vested in the senior engineering and
administrative employees vis-a-vis the nonsenior employees in their work groups, nor
is it vested in themselves as equals, who, for indeterminate periods of time, "super-
vise" coequals who, in turn, later "supervise" their equals while simultaneously being
"supervised" by their coequals. 44
41. Id. at 857.
42. Id. at 858.
43. Id. at 858-59 (footnote omitted). The architect cases relied on are discussed at pt. III(A)(2)
infra.
44. 213 N.L.R.B. at 859. The Board relied here on a decision concerning non-professional
[Vol. 45
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General Dynamics implicitly repudiates the Warren Petroleum and
American Oil approach to the supervisory status of professionals, i.e.,
it concludes that the possession of any of the powers enumerated in
section 2(11) by a professional is simply not sufficient to support a
finding of supervisory status, as it is in the case of a non-professional,
without further scrutiny. Moreover, the decision is at odds both with
the result in Westinghouse Electric and with that portion of its
reasoning which relied so heavily on the fact that those professionals
supervised only non-professionals. In addition, the decision goes a
good deal beyond the notion that the degree of supervision is merely
that given by the more experienced to the less, as in the case of a
leadman or strawboss. Thus it recognizes that the exercise of real
supervisory power may nevertheless not render a professional a statu-
tory supervisor. However, while General Dynamics opened the door to
a candid reconciliation of the conflict between professional and super-
visory status, the following year the Board decided a case4 5 on grounds
indistinguishable from Warren Petroleum wholly without reference to
General Dynamics.
2. Architects
As in the instance of engineering project managers, professional
architects may serve as project captains in which capacity they coordi-
nate and direct architectural work. However, the Board has consis-
tently declined to hold them to be supervisors. In one case it suggested
that their relationship to their subordinates is merely based on greater
experience; to that extent it tacitly follows the non-supervisory "lead-
men" theory. 4 6 In two others the Board recognized their direction of
others as part of the professional work necessary to complete an
architectural project. 47 However, the Board stressed alternatively that
only responsible direction rather than hiring and firing was involved 48
news editors. Post-Newsweek Stations, 203 N.L.R.B. 522 (1973). Chairman Miller. dissenting.
rejected the alternative posed by Westinghouse Electric (though neither he nor the majority refers
explicitly to that decision) because it "would present a totally unworkable situation . . and
would inevitably create conflicts of interest for the employee, leaving him torn as to whether his
real allegiance ought to be to the management or to his work group on the other side of the
bargaining table." 213 N.L.R.B. at 870. Thus he would adhere to American Oil though, again,
neither he nor the majority acknowledged that decision.
45. Aeronca, Inc., 90 L.R.R.M. 1709 (1975).
46. Frederick Confer & Assocs., 193 N.L.R.B. 910 (1971). See also Howard A Friedman &
Assocs., 192 N.L.R.B. 919 (1971).
47. Wurster, Bernardi & Emmons, Inc., 192 N.L.R.B. 1049, 1051 (1971), Skidmore, Owings
& Merrill, 192 N.L.R.B. 920, 921 (1971).
48. 192 N.L.R.B. at 1051.
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and that the direction was only given other professionals. 49 The latter
ground is plainly inconsistent with the reasoning supporting Westing-
house Electric, which is nowhere adverted to. The former implicitly
suggests that sections 2(11) and 2(12) may be reconciled on the basis of
distinguishing responsible direction by professionals as of lesser dimen-
sion than the performance of other supervisory functions enumerated
in section 2(11). Given this tacit assumption it is not suprising that the
Board majority in General Dynamics, relying upon the architect deci-
sions, has so difficult a time in dealing with the project manager's role
in evaluating team members as distinguished from his role in assigning
and directing them.
3. Pharmacists
The Board has had no difficulty in concluding that a professional
pharmacist, largely unassisted and working exclusively in the phar-
macy department of a retail drug store, is not a supervisor. 50 On the
other hand, the Board has held one to be a supervisor where he has the
dual status of an assistant store manager with at least theoretically
larger responsibilities for the entire store in the absence of the store
manager.5 1 This view was reaffirmed recently in Superx Drugs of
Texas, Inc.,52 over Member Fanning's strong dissent. He pointed
out that the pharmacist spent 85 to 95 percent of the time working
strictly in the pharmacy department and that his "supervision" in
the absence of the store manager was routine or non-existent. It also
should be noted that the other employees over whom the pharmacist
possessed theoretical supervisory authority were sales and cosmetics
personnel.
The Board has had greater difficulty where the pharmacist was in
charge solely of the pharmacy department. In some cases it has
considered the duties routine for a senior employee.5 3 In others, where
the responsibilities appear to have been more extensive especially in
hiring and evaluating employees, the Board has found supervisory
status even though the personnel involved were typists, clerks and
drug interns, i.e., non-professionals and "junior professional assis-
49. 192 N.L.R.B. at 921.
50. See, e.g., Musselman's Apothecary, 188 N.L.R.B. 105 (1971); White Cross Stores, Inc.,
186 N.L.R.B. 492 (1970) (and the cases discussed therein).
51. Hook Drugs, Inc., 191 N.L.R.B. 189, 192 (1971); Walgreen La. Co., 186 N.L.R.B. 129,
130 (1970); Walgreen La. Co., 182 N.L.R.B. 541, 542 (1970) (Brown, Member, dissenting);
Say-On Drugs, Inc., 138 N.L.R.B. 1032, 1035 (1962).
52. 89 L.R.R.M. 1193, 1194 (1975).
53. Skaggs Drug Centers, Inc., 197 N.L.R.B. 1240 (1972) (head pharmacist); cf. Lane Drug
Co., 160 N.L.R.B. 1147, 1149 (1966) (chief pharmacist).
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tants" clearly encompassed by section 2(12)(b). S4 Member Fanning,
dissenting in a recent decision,"5 relied heavily on the fact that (as in
other cases) the pharmacist's supervisory responsibilities were man-
dated by state law. Thus he drew a distinction between professional
and supervisory responsibility: "The professional responsibility im-
posed upon the pharmacists-in-charge by the State regulations involves
the exercise of 'discretion and judgment,' which are an index of
'professional employee' status under Section 2(12) of our Act, rather
than supervisory status under Section 2(1 J). ' '56 Unlike the Board
majority, Member Fanning recognized the need to reconcile profes-
sional and supervisory status. However, his proposed analysis assumes
that a clear distinction between "professional" and "supervisory" work
can be drawn.
B. Professionals in Education
1. Faculties and Faculty Committees in Higher Education
In 1970 the Board extended its jurisdiction for private non-profit
institutions of higher education.57 Soon thereafter it confronted the
assertion that faculty members were supervisors. The basis for the
challenge lay in the system of governance widely recognized in Amer-
ican higher education which gives the faculty a significant role in
recommendations on faculty appointment, promotion, re-appointment,
tenure and dismissal as well as for matters of educational policy and
program. Nevertheless, the Board has consistently refused to oust the
faculty or members of its committees from the Act's protection. 8 It has
relied upon three grounds. First, the authority possessed by the faculty
or its committees, divisions and departments is purely recommenda-
54. Ward Cut-Rate Drug Co., 207 N.L.R.B. 589, 590 (1973); Grand Rx Drug Stores, 193
N.L.R.B. 525, 526 (1971); Katz Drug Co., 123 N.L.R.B. 1615, 1617 (1959).
55. Snyder Bros. Sun-Ray Drug, 208 N.L.R.B. 628 (1974).
56. Id. at 630 (emphasis added).
57. Cornell Univ., 183 N.L.R.B. 329, 331 (1970).
58. In chronological order the cases are C.W. Post Center, 189 N.L.R B. 904 (1971);
Fordham Univ., 193 N.L.R.B. 134 (1971) [Fordham I]; Adelphi Univ., 195 N.LR-B. 639 (1972),
New York Univ., 205 N.L.R.B. 4 (1973) [NYU I]; University of Miami. 213 N.L.R.B. 634
(1974); Fordham Univ., 87 L.R.R.M. 1643 (1974) [Fordham II]; Northeastern Univ , 89
L.R.R.M. 1862 (1975); Yeshiva Univ., 91 L.R.R.M. 1017 (1975); New York Univ., 91 L.RR.M.
1165 (1975) [NYU III. The First Circuit has agreed that faculty may appropriately be considered
employees at least in institutions where they have limited influence. NLRB v Wentworth
Institute, 515 F.2d 550 (1st Cir. 1975). This and related issues are discussed more fully in Finkin,
The NLRB in Higher Education, 5 U. Toledo L. Rev. 608 (1974); Kahn, The NLRB and Higher
Education: The Failure of Policymaking Through Adjudication, 21 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 63 (1973),
Pollitt & Thompson, Collective Bargaining on the Campus: A Survey Five Years after Cornell, 1
Indus. Rel. L.J. 191 (1976).
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tory with final decision-making authority vested in the institution's
governing board or delegated by it to the administration. Second,
section 2(11) speaks only of "any individual" who possesses any of the
enumerated powers, not of collectives. Third, section 2(11) also re-
quires that the authority be exercised "in the interest of the employer"
which in turn assumes that one is acting for and thus is accountable to
higher authority. Faculties, however, are not "accountable" to man-
agement in the sense of being subject to personal sanction or control
based on management's assessment of the worth of the faculty recom-
mendation. Thus it is not the kind of supervision contemplated by the
Act.
However, faculty members may also hire, direct and fire some
non-professional support staff. In Adelphi University,5 9 the Board
refused to hold an administrator, the director of admissions, to be a
supervisor even though he had the authority to hire a secretary. Citing
Westinghouse Electric the Board observed:
[W]here professionals regularly (more than 50 percent of the time) supervised nonunit
[non-professional] employees, they were nevertheless excluded from a unit of profes-
sional employees, since under such circumstances the principal interests of the ex-
cluded professionals were so allied with management as to establish a differentiation
between them and other employees in the unit.
60
The Board explained that the "sporadic exercise of supervisory author-
ity" over non-professionals presents no real conflict of interest nor does
it effectively make the professional an ally of management engendering
the more generalized conflict to which section 2(11) was specifically
directed. Later cases have elevated this observation into something of
a rule that professionals who spend less than 50 percent of their time
supervising non-professionals will not be deemed a supervisor. 6 1
2. Department Chairmen
Academic offerings are usually organized into departments, divisions
or programs and are presided over by a program member bearing the
title of chairman, head, director, or coordinator, but which for con-
venience will all be treated here as "chairman." They make effective
recommendations on the status of faculty members in their depart-
ments and may have more direct authority for the hiring of part-time
faculty and non-professional staff. They are responsible for the admin-
istration of the department and may receive additional remuneration
59. 195 N.L.R.B. 639, 643 (1972). Member Kennedy dissented in part.
60. Id. at 644 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
61. See, e.g., New York Univ., 91 L.R.R.M. 1165, 1171 (1975); Northeastern Univ., 89
L.R.R.M. 1862, 1870 (1975); Fordham Univ., 87 L.R.R.M. 1643, 1648 (1974).
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and released time from teaching to perform those functions. They
serve in that capacity for a stated term, often renewable, and are
appointed and usually are removable by higher administration. On the
other hand, by regulation or practice much of their discretion may be
circumscribed by the role of the program's faculty. On those matters
which the faculty deems of greatest importance, e.g., appointment and
tenure, the chairman's position may carry no greater weight than those
of senior colleagues in the department. Where he exercises discretion,
e.g., in the hiring of part-time teachers or in assigning merit salary
increments, it may be because the faculty has tacitly delegated that
task to him to act on their behalf or has simply acquiesced to the need
for one of their number to act. The faculty plays an often dispositive
role in the selection of the chairman, who usually comes from and
returns to their ranks, and an influential role in his retention or
removal; chairmen continue to serve in their faculty positions though
in some cases they may have their course load reduced to release them
for the additional duties. In sum, the chairman, Janus-like, is often
expected to represent the administration to his faculty and his faculty
to the administration, in which latter role he may be expected to
champion persons or causes highly unpopular with higher authority.
Thus it is not suprising that the Board has had considerable diffi-
culty with these "dual status" employees. In effect, the Board has
developed two lines of cases, neither of which appears to acknowledge
the other. The first, 62 strongly reminiscent of the Warren Petroleum
approach to industrial scientists, has simply looked to the authority
possessed by the chairman. If his authority is effective and concerns
any of the matters enumerated in section 2(11), the Board has held it,
without more, to be supervisory. The second line63 has looked to
whether the chairman consults with the faculty or is otherwise con-
strained by the system of faculty governance. If he is, then the Board
has declined to hold him a supervisor. However, the theoretical basis
for the more sophisticated result remains somewhat ambiguous. The
Board recently has observed that the authority of the chairman is
62. University of Vermont, 91 L.R.R.M. 1570, 1574 (1976); Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute,
89 L.R.R.M. 1844, 1847 (1975); Point Park College, 209 N.L.R.B. 1064 (1974), Loretto Heights
College, 205 N.L.R.B. 1134, 1136 (1973); Farleigh Dickinson Univ., 205 N.L.R.B. 673, 675
(1973); Syracuse Univ., 204 N.L.R.B. 641, 642 (1973); Adelphi Univ., 195 N L.R B_ 639, 641-42
(1972); Long Island Univ. (Brooklyn Center), 189 N.L.R.B. 909 (1971); C W. Post Center, 189
N.L.R.B. 904, 906 (1971).
63. Fordhan Univ. I and II, supra note 58; NYU I and II, supra note 58, Yeshiva Univ., 91
L.R.R.M. 1017 (1975); Northeastern Univ., 89 L.R.R.M. 1862 (1975); University of Miami, 213
N.L.R.B. 634 (1974); Tusculum College, 199 N.L.R.B. 28 (1972); Florida S College, 196
N.L.R.B. 888 (1972); University of Detroit, 193 N.L.R.B. 566 (1971).
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"effectively diffused among the department faculty pursuant to the
principle of collegiality."' 64 This is identical to the second justification
for rejecting the supervisory status of the entire faculty or its commit-
tees, i.e., it is not really "individual" authority as required by section
2(11). Where chairmen do act individually on some matters, albeit in a
strongly collegial environment, the Board has been compelled to view
their actions as ineffective, on grounds that it is subject to review by
higher authority, in order to hold them to be non-supervisory. 65 While
in actuality the Board is determining whether chairmen function
primarily in the interest of either the higher administrator or the
collegial group, it is casting its decisions on grounds that the chairmen
have no effective authority because it is "diffused" within the faculty or
subject to further review. 66
Moreover, the Board has buttressed its decisions holding chairmen
to be supervisors by emphasizing the chairman's role in the hiring and
direction of non-professional support staff. 67 However, under the
Adelphi rule such activity, if engaged in less than half the time, would
not result in supervisory status. As a result the Board has simply
ignored the Adelphi rule when finding chairmen to be supervisors
while simultaneously relying upon it when holding them not to be
supervisors.
68
3. Principal Investigators
Faculty members may receive grants from public or private sources
to undertake research and are denominated the "principal investigator"
under the grant. In that capacity a faculty member has authority to
hire, fire and direct such supporting staff as the grant may allow,
either professional, non-professional or both. In this he is limited only
by the terms of the grant and by any institutional policies governing
grant administration.
In its first confrontation the Board concluded that personnel
employed on grant money were not employees of the University. 69 As a
result faculty members who also were principal investigators were not
viewed as supervising employees of the employer and thus were not
supervisors under the Act. More recently the Board has realized that
64. 91 L.R.R.M. at 1020.
65. See, e.g., Fordham II, supra note 58, at 1648.
66. In parochial secondary education the Board has drawn a similar line. Compare Roman
Catholic Archdiocese of Baltimore, 88 L.R.R.M. 1169 (1975) with Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 90
L.R.R.M. 1225 (1975).
67. Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, 89 L.R.R.M. 1844, 1847 (1975); Syracuse Univ., 204
N.L.R.B. 641, 642 (1973).
68. NYU II, supra note 58, at 1175-76.
69. Fordham I, supra note 58; NYU I, supra note 58.
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such "soft money" appointees nevertheless are carried on the payroll of
the institution which administers the grant and are subject to its
relevant policies governing personnel. Accordingly, it has rejected the
non-employee status of grant support staff. As a result it has concluded
that faculty members are supervisors when serving as principal inves-
tigators of grants which require them to supervise other professionals
or non-professionals in the latter instance, presumably more than fifty
percent of the time. 70 The Board has recognized that this approach
created what is termed a "popcorn" unit, i.e., with faculty popping in
and out on the basis of receiving research funds which require the
requisite degree of administration. 7 1
However, in its reconsideration of the issue in the New York
University7 2 decision the Board supplied a far more refined analysis. It
observed that the decision to apply for a particular grant is based on
the interests of the faculty member who would become its principal
investigator and that the degree of actual control exercised by the
University is minimal. Indeed if the faculty member moves to another
institution the common practice is for the grant to transfer with him.
Thus the Board concluded that principal investigators do not supervise
their support staff "in the interest of the University" and noted:
There is nothing to suggest that any direction of a research project by a principal
investigator is on behalf of the University rather than on behalf of the principal
investigator and the contracting agency. . . . Significantly, there is no indication that
the University requires principal investigators to evaluate the work of employees on his
project or that the University evaluates a principal investigator's performance or
ability as a supervisor. Any "employees" are also compensated by funds provided by
the contracting agency for that purpose and there is no indication in the record that
they are accountable to anyone other than the principal investigator for their work on
the contract.
7 3
As in its treatment of chairmen and industrial research project mana-
gers, the Board has not been consistent in dealing with principal
investigators.7 4
4. Librarians
The Board has tended to apply the Adelphi rule fairly consistently to
professional librarians.75 However, the rule was not utilized in the
70. Yeshiva Univ., 91 L.R.R.M. 1017, 1021 (1975); Northeastern Univ., 89 L.RR.M_ 1862,
1870 (1975); Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, 89 L.R.R.M. 1844, 1847-48 (1975).
71. Northeastern Univ., 89 L.R.R.M. 1862, 1870 (1975).
72. 91 L.R.R.M. 1165 (1975).
73. Id. at 1175.
74. University of Vermont, 91 L.R.R.M. 1570 (1976), decided four months after NYU 11,
concluded that principal investigators were supervisors without reference to NYU II or the
approach embraced by it.
75. See, e.g., NYU II, supra note 58; Fordham II, supra note 58.
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context of a charge against the University of Chicago that it had
violated section 8(a)(2) of the Act 7 6 because of the involvement of
alleged supervisory librarians in the affairs of a local union of profes-
sional librarians. 77 The administrative law judge reflected extensively
on the relationship of professional work to supervisory status.78
Nevertheless, he rejected the application of the Adelphi rule. It
applied, in his opinion, solely to sporadic supervision severable from or
tangential to the professional's "normal duties." Supervision of clerical
employees by professional librarians was considered as a fully inte-
grated part of the librarians' function.
The Board, differing in part with the administrative law judge,
proceeded to hold all the challenged librarians to be supervisors. In so
doing it agreed with the administrative law judge that it was irrelevant
to the supervisory determination whether supervison by professionals
was over non-professionals; the Board held some librarians to be
supervisors even though such authority was exercised solely over
non-professionals. However, the Board then held that as to that
category no violation of section 8(a)(2) could be sustained where these
supervisors were active only in a union of professional librarians.
Although application of the Adelphi rule would have achieved the
same result, the Board declined to apply it. The Seventh Circuit found
no fault with the result relying, however, on the Adelphi decision. 79
76. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1970).
77. University of Chicago Library, 205 N.L.R.B. 220 (1973), enforced, 506 F.2d 1402 (7th
Cir. 1974) (decision published without opinion).
78. "Like college teachers who plan school courses, instruct students, direct research assis-
tants, and generally supervise the functioning of the institution as such, librarians too practice
their profession in a very technical sense. In deciding, according to their professional expertise,
how best to select books, catalogue them, index information, and efficiently make all materials
available to the 'public,' they determine the duties of their subordinates, whether lower-echelon
professionals or clerks and typists. They 'direct' the people below them in order to achieve tile
ultimate objective of a well-run library. In a real sense, these are not supervisory functions as
traditionally envisaged in the industrial world. A more meaningful comparison would be to the
skilled journeyman or craftsman who 'directs' his helper, or learner, and who in the process also
decides how and when the assistant works. That the journeyman does not supervise his helper in
the statutory meaning of the word has long been accepted under Board law.
"For these reasons I think the fact that some librarians at the University of Chicago make
effective recommendations on how to organize their departments or sections, what type of
employees to hire for one aspect of the work or another, how many to use here or there, or even
what wage scale would be justified for the various subordinate or clerical duties, proves only their
professional status, and serves not at all to prove they are supervisors in the statutory sense. And
this is equally true of their duty to verify the precise job descriptions of other employees; certainly
if they are responsible for recommending what the job contents should be, they must also certify
that the employee is in fact doing what is called for." Id. at 229.
79. University of Chicago v. NLRB, 506 F.2d 1402 (7th Cir. 1974). The relevant portion of
the opinion is appended to a case comment. 6 Loyola U.L.J. 758, 773 (1975).
[Vol. 45
SUPERVISORY STATUS
While the reasoning in support of University of Chicago Library is
compatible with the reasoning in Adelphi, the finding in the former
that the librarians were statutory supervisors differs sharply with the
result in Adelphi.
C. Professionals in Medical and Social Services
1. Registered Nurses
Prior to the 1974 amendments extending the Act to non-profit health
care facilities,80 the Board had considered the supervisory status of
registered nurses in proprietary nursing homes. In Doctors' Hospital, 81
the Board held floor head nurses to be supervisors largely because of
their role in assigning and evaluating the non-professional support
personnel. In a supplemental decision in that case the Board rejected
the application of Westinghouse Electric to relief head nurses because
they performed mingled supervisory and non-supervisory duties over
the same complement of employees.8 2 The Board explained that
registered nurses are a highly trained group of professionals who normally inform
other, lesser skilled, employees as to the work to be performed for patients and insure
that such work is done. But, their daily on-the-job duties and authority in this regard
are solely a product of their highly developed professional skills and do not, without
more, constitute an exercise of supervisory authority in the interest of their Employer.
In the. . . [prior decision], we found the floor head nurses, inter alia, to be supervisors
because, in addition to performing their professional duties and responsibilities, they
also possessed the authority to make effective recommendations which affected the job
status and pay of the employees working on their wings.8 3
The Board later held that registered nurses who serve as "house
supervisors" were statutory supervisors.8 4 As the sole registered nurse
on duty for each shift, they responsibly directed non-professional
support personnel; it was a sufficient basis for a finding of supervisory
status. Similarly, in the context of an unfair labor practice, the Board
affirmed a finding that a registered nurse was a supervisor based
primarily on her role in the assignment, direction and evaluation of
support staff.85
80. 29 U.S.C. § 152(14) (Supp. V, 1975), amending 29 U.S.C. § 152 (1970).
81. 175 N.L.R.B. 354 (1969).
82. Doctors' Hospital of Modesto, Inc., 183 N.L.R.B. 950 (1970), enforced, 489 F.2d 772 (9th
Cir. 1973).
83. Id. at 951-52. See also Convalescent Center of Honolulu, 180 N.L.R.B. 461 (1969) ("The
registered nurses are a highly trained group of professionals who normally inform other, lesser
skilled, employees as to the work to be performed for patients and insure that such work is
done.')
84. Rockville Nursing Center, 193 N.L.R.B. 959, 962 (1971).
85. New Fairview Hall Convalescent Home, 206 N.L.R.B. 688 (1973).
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Congress was called on to consider the supervisory role of profes-
sionals in health care when framing the 1974 amendments. The
American Nurses Association pointed out that nursing care was pro-
vided by a team involving both professionals and non-professionals
and called for an amendment which would make it clear that only
those registered nurses "who truly and substantially possess and exer-
cise such authority over other registered nurses '8 6 should be deemed
supervisory. On similar grounds the Committee of Interns and Resi-
dents argued for an amendment limiting the supervisory definition in
case of health care professionals to those "engaged on a full time and
exclusive basis in the performance of non-professional supervisory
duties."'87 Nevertheless, the Senate committee concluded that such an
amendment was not needed.
Various organizations representing health care professionals have urged an amendment
to Section 2(11) of the Act so as to exclude such professionals from the definition of
"supervisor." The Committee has studied this definition with particular reference to
health care professionals, such as registered nurses, interns, residents, fellows, and
salaried physicians and concludes that the proposed amendment is unnecessary be-
cause of existing Board decisions. The Committee notes that the Board has carefully
avoided applying the definition of "supervisor" to a health care professional who gives
direction to other employees in the exercise of professional judgment, which direction
is incidental the [sic] the professional's treatment of patients, and thus is not the
exercise of supervisory authority in the interest of the employer.
The Committee expects the Board to continue evaluating the facts of each case in
this manner when making its determinations.8"
As a result, the Board has chosen to view the Committee's report as
a virtual amendment of section 2(11) in the health care field. Thus it
has inquired solely whether the supervision is an incident of profes-
sional service or in addition to professional service. This has produced
some rather fine lines as well as disputes within the Board. 89 In
86. Statement of the American Nurses' Ass'n in Hearings on S. 794 Before the Subcomm. on
Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 122 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Statement of Nurses].
87. Statement for the Committee of Interns and Residents, id. at 296 [hereinafter cited as
Statement of Interns].
88. S. Rep. No. 766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1974). Against this legislative history the Board's
refusal to consider interns and residents to be employees is, as dissenting Member Fanning made
clear, nothing short of astonishing. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, 91 L.R.R.M. 1398, 1401 (1976).
89. Fort Tryon Nursing Home, 223 N.L.R.B. No. 96 (1976) (nursing supervisors are
supervisors); Valley Hosp., Ltd., 90 L.R.R.M. 1411 (1975) (neither head nurses nor charge nurses
are supervisors); Victor Valley Hosp., 90 L.R.R.M. 1341 (1975) (shift supervisors are supervisors,
charge nurses are not); St. Mary's Hosp., Inc., 90 L.R.R.M. 1316 (1975) (nursing clinicians are
supervisors, nursing care coordinators are not); Oak Ridge Hosp., 90 L.R.R.M. 1217 (1975)
(charge nurses and team leaders not supervisors); Meharry Medical College, 90 L.R.R.M. 1108
(1975) (charge nurses are not supervisors); Newton-Wellseley Hosp., 90 L.R.R.M. 1090 (1975)
(head nurses are not supervisors); Gnaden Huetten Memorial Hosp., Inc., 89 L.R.R.M. 1761
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Trustees of Noble Hospital,90 for example, the three member majority
held the nurse "supervisors" to be statutory supervisors while the head
nurses and assistant head nurses were not. The former were fully in
charge of their shifts including assignment, transfer and discipline of
shift employees. To meet accreditation requirements, the supervisors
prepared written evaluations for all shift employees. The Board,
relying on the Senate report, noted that "beyond these professional
considerations, the traditional standards for determining supervisory
status remain applicable" '91 and held the duties presented to go beyond
the exercise of professional judgment. The head nurses, however, were
in charge of units (intensive care, emergency room, operating room,
etc.) instead of shifts. They assign personnel, prepare work schedules,
and evaluate employees in their units though some of what they did in
this area was subject to approval by higher authority. This, the
majority held, was all an exercise of professional judgment "incidental
to their treatment of patients. ' 92 Later cases have made mention of
whether the professional supervises only non-professionals and of the
amount of time spent in administrative work. 93 Nevertheless, the
touchstone has consistently been the language in the Senate report.
2. Social Workers
In Child and Family Service of Springfield, Inc., 94 the Board held
social workers to be professional employees. However, it held two
(1975) (charge nurses are supervisors); Presbyterian Medical Center, 89 L.R.R.M 1752 (1975)
(head nurses are supervisors, charge nurses are not); Doctors Hosp., 89 L.R.R.M. 1525 (1975)
(nursing coordinators are not supervisors); Driftwood Convalescent Hosp., 89 L.R.RM. 1493
(1975) (charge nurses are not supervisors); Bishop Randell Hosp., 89 L.R.R.M. 1249 (1975) (nurse
supervisors and head nurses are supervisors); Wing Memorial Hosp., 89 L.R.R.M. 1 l83 (1975)
(shift supervisors are statutory supervisors, head nurses are not).
90. 89 L.R.R.M. 1806 (1975).
91. Id. at 1808.
92. Id. at 1809. Chairman Murphy and Member Kennedy dissented. It appears from the
opinion that Chairman Murphy also seems to accept Member Kennedy's disagreement with the
Adelphi rule.
93. St. Mary's Hosp., Inc., 90 L.R.R.M. 1316, 1317 (1975) ("It is estimated that a clinician,
as part of her regular duties, must spend 25 percent of her time doing administrative work on
behalf of the Employer."); Newton-Wellesley Hosp., 90 L.R.R.M. 1090, 1094 n.9 (1975) ("Three
of the four head nurses who testified in this proceeding testified without contradiction that they
spend between 70 and 90 percent of their time in direct patient care."); Gnaden Huetten
Memorial Hosp., Inc., 89 L.R.R.M. 1761, 1762 (1975) ("The head nurses spend about 10 percent
of their time performing staff RN duties, and the charge nurses spend about 20 percent of their
time performing RN duties. Both head and charge nurses spend their remaining time performing
administrative and supervisory functions.") (footnote omitted); Doctors Hosp.. 89 L.R.R.M.
1525, 1528 (1975) ("Coordinators also testified that, like the staff nurses, the vast majority of their
time is spent in patient care.").
94. 90 L.R.R.M. 1211 (1975).
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senior social workers to be supervisors. The total analysis was supplied
by a single paragraph dealing primarily with one of the two. She spent
40 percent of her time in counseling and the remainder in scheduling
and assigning personnel and in "overseeing the activities of two
employees as well as students."9 5 She had authority to grant time off,
adjust grievances and reprimand, as well as evaluate employees.
Similarly in Mental Health Services-Erie County South East Corp. v.
Buffalo, 9 6 program directors who hired, supervised and assigned unit
personnel were held to be supervisors. Thus the Board has totally
ignored Adelphi and has proceeded, as in Warren Petroleum, on the
basis of a straightforward application of section 2(11).
IV. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE BOARD'S PERFORMANCE
Any assessment must comprehend both the manner in which the
Board has chosen to proceed as well as the substantive approaches it
has taken. On the former, the Board has proceeded entirely on a
case-by-case basis. While that is unsurprising, 97 total reliance on
litigation as a means of formulating substantive doctrine has had
unfortunate consequences. First, because each category of employment
has been treated largely as sui generis there has been little comparison
with other professional employments; this, in turn, has hindered the
formulation of a single, generally applicable approach reconciling
sections 2(11) and 2(12). Second, the Board's insistence on litigation
has favored any management inclined to delay an election in order to
dissipate union support, simply by challenging professionals on super-
visory grounds. As a result, assuming the union declines to accede to a
unit most favorable to the employer, the Board's own workload has
been increased unnecessarily while affected employees have been de-
nied the right to select or reject a representative. Third, the later
determination that active union supporters were actually supervisors
may create substantial problems, for example, vitiating so much of the
union's showing of interest as the later-determined supervisors secured.
Finally, the Board has been largely dependent on the parties to present
the facts and bring relevant precedents to bear. Representation pro-
ceedings lack the formality and frequently the preparation involved in
unfair labor practice cases; often the union is not represented by
counsel. As a result, the Board has been relatively unconstrained to
95. Id. at 1213.
96. 90 L.R.R.M. 1394 (1975).
97. See generally Bernstein, The NLRB's Adjudication-Rule Making Dilemma under the
Administrative Procedure Act, 79 Yale L.J. 571 (1970); Peck, A Critique of the National Labor
Relations Board's Performance in Policy Formulation: Adjudiation and Rule-Making, 117 U. la.
L. Rev. 254 (1968).
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explain contrary conclusions in comparable cases and has frequently
ignored precedents at odds with the result in the particular case. This
lessens the stature of the agency and casts doubt on the soundness of
its conclusions generally. Moreover, the development of inconsistent
lines of authority has served only to encourage further litigation and to
exacerbate the problems of delay, workload and unpredictability.
Turning to the substantive aspects, as the foregoing amply evi-
dences, the Board has developed wholly inconsistent lines of decisional
authority not only for the determination of supervisory status of
professionals generally but even as to discrete categories of em-
ployment within a profession. Nevertheless, review of the Board's
record reveals five approaches transcending the particulars of the job
at issue. The Board has: (1) applied section 2(11) precisely as it has to
non-professionals; (2) distinguished responsible direction from other of
the supervisory indices; (3) determined whether the supervisory work is
"incident" or "in addition to" professional work; (4) determined
whether the supervision is "genuinely managerial" rather than an
"essential part of professional service"; and, (5) made distinctions
based on whether the individual supervises professionals or non-
professionals and how much time is spent on supervisory activity.
Consideration should be given to each of these.
A. Adherence to Industrial Precedents
Under section 2(11) alone, the mere possession of authority over any
one of the enumerated criteria results in supervisory status. 98 Applica-
tion of this analysis to professionals is at odds with section 2(12) and its
legislative history as well as with the realities of how professional work
is performed. To be sure, in some cases the Board has drawn an
analogy to decisions in which it found leaders of non-professional work
groups or teams to be non-supervisory. 99 The analogy is quite close
because the jobs involved in these cases required a high degree of craft
or art very similar to the expertise engendered by professional educa-
98. The leading decision is Ohio Power Co. v. NLRB, 176 F.2d 385 (6th Cir ), cert denied,
338 U.S. 899 (1949), noted in 11 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 345 (1950). See generally Comment, The Status
of Supervisors under the National Labor Relations Act, 35 La. L. Rev 800 (1975).
99. For example, General Dynamics Corp., 213 N.L.R.B. 851 (1974), relied upon Post-
Newsweek Stations, 203 N.L.R.B. 522 (1973) concerning news editors. To similar effect see
Post-Newsweek Stations, 89 L.R.R.M. 1147 (1975); Golden West Broadcasters--KTLA, 88
L.R.R.M. 1053 (1974); Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 209 N.L.R.B. 788, enforced per curiam,
503 F.2d 1055 (2d Cir. 1974). See also Musical Theater Ass'n, 90 L.R.R.M. 1633, 1636 (1975)
("[Tihe artistic direction and instruction of performers by a director or choreographer is in the
nature of professional direction and is not to be equated with the exercise of supervisory authority
in the Employers' interest.").
19771
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
tion. Those cases are themselves somewhat strained (if creative) exten-
sions of industrial precedent and their further extension into profes-
sional employment as a consistent approach would be tantamount to
the establishment of a legal fiction, i.e., that professionals with actual
authority to hire, assign and evaluate or effectively so to recommend
are nevertheless to be viewed simply as mere "leadmen" or "straw-
bosses." As with legal fictions in general, the extension of this analogy
beyond the reasonable limits of the language, in order to conform to
perceived need, ultimately compels a more direct approach. 00 In sum,
adherence to the analysis customarily applied to non-professional
supervisors fails to acknowledge that Congress delegated a significant
problem to the Board.
B. Distinguishing Responsible Direction
Implicit in a special exemption for responsible direction by profes-
sionals is the assumption that some accommodation between sections
2(11) and 2(12) must be made. Moreover, this approach can draw some
sustenance from the Senate Committee's later observation that the
Board had appropriately failed to find health care professionals to be
supervisors if they give "direction" to others in the exercise of profes-
sional judgment "which direction is incidental" to the professional's
role in patient care. 101 Indeed the Board's then General Counsel has
read the report just this narrowly.10 2
However, in seeking an amendment the nurses' association pointed
out that nurses exercise "professional judgment" in "evaluating
whether good and adequate patient care is being given by others,"' 0 3
i.e., in preparing evaluations of the professional and non-professional
staff, which would bear on the effective recommendatory role of nurses
in decisions on retention, promotion and discipline. Moreover, the
100. See generally Fuller, Legal Fictions (pt. 1), 25 Ill. L. Rev. 363 (1930).
101. S. Rep. No. 766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1974).
102. Nash, Initial Questions from Hospital Legislative Amendments to the NLRA, in
Proceedings of NYU Twenty-Seventh Conference on Labor 93, 103 (1975).
103. The Statement of Nurses, supra note 86, pointed out: "The health team providing the
actual care to patients within the unit may consist of several types of personnel-the nursing aide,
the practical nurse and the registered nurse. The registered nurse, as the professional member of
this group, provides the direction for care of the patient. In this sense, the senior nurse or head
nurse or the nurse 'in charge' of the nursing care unit or of a group of patients, functions as a
patient care coordinator: determining the patient's needs, determining who among the staff shall
care for the patient, and providing the advance and consultation needed by less prepared or less
experienced team members. The nurse utilizes professional judgment in providing direct care to
patients and in evaluating whether good and adequate patient care is being given by others,
whether medical directives are being carried out appropriately and whether records are ade-
quately maintained within the unit so that continuity of patient care can go on despite the shifts
in personnel." Id. at 121.
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Board has, as in Noble Hospital, considered the performance of other
of the supervisory criteria as not necessarily resulting in supervisory
status. Thus an exemption solely for responsible direction is simply too
constricted. It is responsive to the situation of the rank-and-file profes-
sional who routinely directs non-professionals as a part of his work,
e.g., secretaries and technicians.104 As a general approach, however, it
suffers from two infirmities, one statutory, the other factual. The
language of section 2(12) supplies no support for the exemption of
professionals solely on grounds of responsible direction. 05 Moreover,
as a factual matter, while professionals generally may engage more
frequently in direction than in exercising other of the supervisory
attributes, they may also perform other supervisory functions, such as
evaluation, equally as part of their professional duties. Indeed as the
studies noted earlier indicate, it is of especial importance to profession-
als that their supervision be in the hands of the profession; 0 6 thus a
more comprehensive analysis is required.
C. Distinguishing Supervision Which Is in Addition to
Professional Work from that Which Is an
Incident of Professional Work
This approach is attractive because it recognizes that actual supervi-
sion going beyond responsible direction may not necessarily separate a
professional from his colleagues and it has seemingly achieved congres-
sional endorsement. However, upon closer scrutiny it becomes clear
that this approach is based on too grudging a view of the Senate
Committee's observations and supplies no workable standard for dis-
tinguishing the supervisor from the non-supervisor.
The Senate report rejected the amendments proposed by the nurses
and the residents and interns not due to disagreement with the goals of
the professional organizations but because the Committee concluded
104. If that is all the distinction is designed to do, it is unnecessary, for the Board had long
held that such routine direction by a professional did not result in supervisory status Air Pilots
Ass'n, 97 N.L.R.B. 929 (1951); Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 75 N.L.R.B. 1132 (1948). See
generally Note, The Unionization of Attorneys, 71 Colum. L. Rev. 100 (1971).
105. Section 2(12) requires that professional work "involv[es] the consistent exercise of
discretion and judgment" while 2(11) requires that all authority for any of the enumerated
subjects be not "merely routine or clerical .... but requires the use of independent judgment."
See notes 1-2 supra.
106. Note, for example, that the accreditation standards for hospitals require: -The nursing
service shall be under the direction of a legally and professionally qualified registered nurse.
There shall also be a sufficient number of duly licensed registered nurses on duty at all times to
plan, assign, supervise and evaluate nursing care, as well as to give patients the nursing care that
requires the judgment and specialized skills of a registered nurse." Accreditation Manual for
Hospitals (Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals) 53 (1973) (emphasis added).
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an amendment was unnecessary due to the Board's ability to accommo-
date the exigencies of professional service within the existing language
of the Act. It should be noted that at the time of the amendments the
Board's Adelphi rule was two years old. Adelphi alone would have
required reconsideration of the reasoning in Doctors' Hospital, which
first supplied the "in addition to" test in the health care field.
Moreover, the Senate Committee's attention was drawn explicitly to
the Board's developing line of higher education decisions covering
department chairmen.10 7 Thus a view more in keeping with both the
tone and substance of the Senate report, given the proposed amend-
ments it was responding to, suggests that Congress merely continued to
delegate to the Board the problem of reconciling section 2(11) with
section 2(12) in the health care field but coupled the renewed delega-
tion with an expression of confidence in the Board's sensitivity to the
issue based on a nascent but developing body of case law. Accordingly,
it does not follow that in rejecting the need for the proposed amend-
ment the Committee necessarily precluded the Board from eventually
accepting the substance of what its proponents desired, i.e., a limita-
tion of supervisory classification to those professionals engaged essen-
tially in the full time supervision of other professionals.
Further, the notion of what is an "incident" of or "in addition to"
professional work is highly porous. The standard seems most readily
applied to dual status employees, i.e., where in addition to work as
engineer, architect, pharmacist, teacher or nurse, the professional
assumes a role separable from the "rank-and-file" professional as
project or department manager, principal investigator, or unit super-
visor. However, as the cases themselves illustrate, professional judg-
ment is an inextricable part of such ostensibly "supervisory" work and,
even while acting in that capacity, the dual status employee may
continue to share a strong community of professional interest with his
non-supervisory colleagues, i.e., he may not be truly aligned with
management as opposed to the professional group. Hence narrow
construction of the Committee report would compel the Board to
proceed on the faulty assumption that professional work and super-
visory work can be conveniently cabined.
D. Distinguishing Supervision Which Is Genuinely
Managerial from that Which Is Part of
Professional Service
This line of reasoning supplies the strongest theoretical basis for
reconciling sections 2(11) and 2(12) for it candidly recognizes that the
107. Statement of Interns, supra note 87.
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exercise of supervisory authority may nevertheless not outweigh the
strong community of interest shared among professional colleagues.
Moreover, it comports most closely to the line of reasoning inherent in
the language and history of section 2(12). As the earlier discussion
pointed out, section 2(12) assumes that senior professionals may super-
vise junior professionals without becoming statutory supervisors, i.e.,
Congress concluded that the policy in favor of separate professional
units will enable the collective representative to accommodate any
internal conflicts engendered by the inclusion of the supervisor with
the supervised. Given that policy it would distort the statute to
conclude that Congress intended to narrow the supervisory exemption
only in that situation. On the contrary, the reasoning in support of the
policy suggests that the Act is better read as extending employee status
to senior professionals who exercise professional judgment in supervis-
ing other senior professionals but whose allegiance to management in
that capacity does not override the community of professional interest
shared with the unit in general. However, this restatement underlines
the fundamental drawback of this analysis as a device to resolve
contested cases: it requires an almost exquisite exploration of the
precise circumstances of the professional and employer involved on a
job-by-job basis.10 8 It should be noted that the vast majority of such
disputes arises in unit determination proceedings which are not directly
reviewable; in the absence of consistent judicial supervision the parties
must depend more heavily on the merits of the agency's determina-
tions. A review of the Board's erratic record cannot inspire confidence
in its ability to proceed consistently with the extraordinary degree of
care and judgment the application of this standard requires.
E. Distinguishing Who Is Supervised and How Much
Time Is Spent
Unlike the determination of whether supervision is genuinely man-
agerial, predicating a decision upon how much time is spent in
supervision and who is supervised holds the possibility of a readily
applied test. However, the Board has, with the singular exception of
the Adelphi rule, treated these factors largely as makeweights, and in
the case of the Adelphi rule itself has applied that test rather selec-
tively. 10 9
108. Section 2(11) compels an examination of what each individual, challenged on supervisory
grounds, has authority to do; nevertheless, the Board, as a practical matter, had to treat
individuals in the aggregate when the challenge is that all incumbents in the position in question
are supervisors even though, as in the department chairmanship, the degree of actual authority
may vary from department to department.
109. Because the Adelphi decision is not a rule at all, the Board is able to decline to apply or
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V. A PROPOSED RESOLUTION
An excellent starting point is provided by the Adelphi "rule." The
Board has established that any professional who supervises non-
professionals less than half the time is not a statutory supervisor. This
approach is entirely consistent with the Act; the individual is not
primarily engaged as a supervisor and his inclusion in a professional
unit will not engender the evil of dual loyalty which Congress was
legislating against. 10 Moreover, it adequately confronts the realities of
even acknowledge it, as is demonstrated in recent decisions on pharmacists, department chair-
men, librarians and registered nurses. Moreover, simultaneous with the Board's failure to apply
Adelphi consistently in professional cases is the Board's expansion of Adelphi to cases involving
the supervisory status of non-professionals. In Automobile Club of Missouri, 209 N.L.R.B. 614
(1974), the Board held insurance salesmen who hire and direct telephone solicitors not to be
supervisors because the employees supervised were casual employees not to be included In the
salesmen's unit. Similarly, in Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 210 N.L.R.B. 928 (1974), the
Board held members of the union label staff to be non-supervisory because the employces they
hired and directed were part-time or casual picketers not to be included in any bargaining unit.
Member Kennedy, who dissented in both cases, argued strongly in Automobile Club of Missouri,
supra: "The exclusion of supervisors from the Section 2(3) definition of 'employee' rests upon
whether an individual qualifies as a Section 2(11) supervisor, and not upon who he supervises
.... Since the definitions of 'employee' and 'supervisor' are mutually exclusive . . . it follows
that statutory supervisors-no matter who they supervise-may not appropriately be included In
a bargaining unit .... ." 209 N.L.R.B. at 616-17 (italics omitted).
The dissent is only partially correct. While the definition of employee and supervisor are
mutually exclusive the definition of professional and supervisor are not.
110. In NYU II, supra note 58, the Board supplied explication of the Adelphl rule:
"Obviously an employee may be engaged in supervising other employees even while not giving
orders. It cannot be expected in every individual case that a hard and fast line can be drawn for
this purpose. That, however, does not invalidate the standard. It is the Employer which assigns
duties to its employees, and in the final analysis it is the duties actually assigned to, and
performed by, the 'supervisor' which determine whether or not the employee is engaged In
supervision outside the unit to an extent which requires exclusion from a unit. The standard is
only an attempt to identify professional employees who, by virtue of their duties with respect to
employees outside a professional unit, are essentially supervisors and not professionals with
incidental nonunit supervisory authority.
"In the case of professional employees in a professional unit the issue is not clear cut.
Professionals, as well as supervisors, exercise discretion and judgment, and professional employ-
ees frequently require the ancillary services of non-professional employees in order to carry out
their professional, not supervisory, responsibilities. But that does not change the nature of their
work from professional to supervisory, nor their relation to management. They are not hired as
supervisors but as professionals. The work of employees that may be 'supervised' by professionals
in this category is merely adjunct to that of the professional and is not the primary work product.
In short, we do not believe that any teacher, lawyer, architect, doctor, editor, etc., whose
employer provides him with the services of a typist, secretary, draftsman, or similar support
personnel, was intended by Congress to be excluded from the Act by the rote application of the
statute without any reference to its purpose or the individual's place on the labor-management
spectrum." Id. at 1175-76.
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unit determination proceedings where the question of supervisory
status is mot often presented, for the issue to be decided in such
litigation solely concerns the amount of time an individual spends
performing supervisory functions; thus it enjoys the benefit of ease of
application and should be expected to curtail the time such challenges
consume."1  There are, however, two difficulties with Adelphi as a
general solution to reconciling sections 2(11) and 2(12). First, it is not
actually a rule. However, while the Board would be better advised to
promulgate the Adelphi standard by rule-making, the Court has made
clear that the Board may insist on proceeding by adjudication. 1 2 As a
result, the courts of appeal must assume the burden of requiring
consistent adherence to the Adelphi test when appropriate cases are
presented. Second, Adelphi is only a partial solution for it does not
deal with the more subtle problem of relationships among profession-
als. The threshold question is whether this determination properly
lends itself to a rule or a rule-like approach. The degree of autonomy
afforded the various professions and the context in which their work is
performed doubtless differ. 113 Accordingly, if the Board could be
trusted to produce decisions which consistently reflect an appreciation
of the special circumstances of the profession and position at issue, the
trade-off in delay inevitably occasioned by adjudication might be
justified. Given the Board's record, however, the better approach
would be to take a larger view of professions as a whole (as Congress
did in fashioning section 2(12)) and to extend Adelphi to relationships
with other professionals both senior and junior. Thus the Board should
consider to be statutory supervisors only those professionals engaged
primarily in the full-time supervision of other professionals. This result
would be based on the valid inference that, in the aggregate, a
professional whose time is primarily consumed in the supervision of
other professionals would more readily tend to be aligned with man-
agement and less likely to be swayed by a community of interest
shared with other professional employees."1 4 By this approach the
111. It seems well beyond peradventure of serious doubt that the Board has the authority to
refine the statutory inferences to be drawn from a given set of facts. Republic Aviation Corp. v.
NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945). Similarly, the courts have approved a quantitative approach to the
analogous policy of the agricultural worker exemption. NLRB v. OLAA Sugar Co., 242 F.2d 714
(9th Cir. 1957). See also NLRB v. Kelly Bros. Nurseries, Inc., 341 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 196S) and
the cases cited therein.
112. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974). Recently, the use of rule-making to
refine the determination of supervisory status has been explicitly endorsed. 1976 Interim Report
and Recommendations of the Chairman's Task Force on the NLRB, (1976] 1 Lab. Rel. Rep.
(BNA) 221, 236.
113. See note 20 supra-
114. Cf. W. Kornhauser, Scientists in Industry 201-02 (1962): "The adaption of the scientist-
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possibility of an erroneous determination is actually less than in an ad
hoc application of the statute under current Board practice. 11
Moreover, both unions and management would know in advance
which side of the line most professionals with some supervisory
responsibility fall. As a result, the liklihood of later challenges to
impermissible supervisory participation in the affairs of the collective
representative would be lessened, the time consumed by representation
proceedings curtailed, and the Board's own workload reduced.
administrator tends to vary according to his rank: the higher the position, the more controlling
are the norms of management and the organization; the lower the position, the more responsive is
the scientist-administrator to professional norms and demands. Since the lower-level positions
entail supervision of scientists on matters closest to their professional interests--such as their
research assignments and procedures and the rating of their research performance-the greater
responsiveness of men in this role is of special importance in accommodating professional norms.
Since high-level scientist-administrators are viewed by the research staff as having primarily
'administrative' responsibilities--the formulation of broad policy, the selection of new personnel,
the drawing up of a budget, and so on-their greater use of bureaucratic authority is more
acceptable to the staff.
"In sum, the strain between professional autonomy and bureaucratic control is accommodated
by the creation of new roles for research administration. Administrative matters are controlled on
the basis of hierarchial principles of authority, while matters regarded by professionals as the
primary responsibility of the individual are more subject to multilateral determination through
colleague relations."
115. This approach assumes that while the professional is acting in the interest of the
employer, the performance of these functions does not so align him with management as to
outweigh the community of interest shared with the professional groups. Even if a professional
performed ostensibly supervisory functions more than half the time, it would still be possible to
show that he did not do so in the interest of management and thus was not a statutory supervisor.
See, e.g., NLRB v. Master Stevedores Ass'n, 418 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1969); International Union of
Brewery Workers v. NLRB, 298 F.2d 297 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 843 (1962).
